ENSRT Incident Note ETS-i-2005-12587
The Enterasys Networks Security Response Team (ENSRT) publishes incident notes to provide information for our constituents to raise awareness of issues deemed threatening to the security and integrity of our customers.
Worms - W32.Reatle@mm and W32.Reatle.C@mm
Release Date: 07/21/2005
Last Updated:
Overview
W32.Reatle@mm and W32.Reatle.C@mm are mass-mailing worms that can also spread by attempting to exploit the Microsoft Windows LSASS Buffer Overrun Vulnerability.
Details below describe the characteristics of the W32.Reatle@mm and W32.Reatle.C@mm worms as well as provide detection, containment, and prevention techniques available through Enterasys Secure Networks solutions.
Systems affected
Windows operating systemsSystems not affected
Linux and MAC/OSXDescription
Worms W32.Reatle@mm and W32.Reatle.C@mm arrive via an e-mail with attachment in the user's mailbox with one of the following Subject lines:
- Message could not be delivered
- Bug
- Error
- Email
- Mail Delivery System
- Importnat Information
- **WARNING** Your Account Currently Disabled.
- Password
- info
- Hello
The worms also contain one of the following e-mail bodies:
- Your credit card was charged for $500 USD. For additional information see the attachment.
- Binary message is available.
- The message contains Unicode characters and has been sent as a binary attachment.
- Here are your banks documents
- The original message was included as an attachment.
- We have temporarily suspended your email account checkout the attachment for more info.
- You have successfully updated the password of your domain account checkout the attachment for more info.
- Important Notification checkout the attachment for more info.
- Your Account Suspended checkout the document.
- Your password has been updated checkout the document.
checkout the attachment.
- Hello,
I was in a hurry and I forgot to attach an important
document. Please see attached.
If the attachment contained within the W32.Reatle@mm and W32.Reatle.C@mm e-mail is executed, it will infect the host machine and begin the propagation process.
This process consists of the following actions:
1) The worm places copies of itself in the Windows system folder.
2) Creates registry entries to ensure worm startup on Windows reboot.
3) Downloads and executes a copy of the W32.Rants.B@mm worm as well as the trojan W32.Wpybot.Worm (C variant only).
4) Alters registry entries to lower security settings or disable the internal firewall and anti-virus security features.
5) Gather's e-mail addresses from system files for later worm propagation.
6) Uses an embedded SMTP engine to send the worm to the previously collected e-mail addresses.
7) Starts an FTP server on TCP port 8885.
8) Attempts to propagate to random IP addresses on TCP port 445 with the Microsoft Windows Local Security Authority Service Remote Buffer Overflow vulnerability.
9) Performs a DoS attack on www.symantec.com's TCP port 1052.
Threat Assessment
Mass-mailing worms if not addressed through prudent remediation steps may congest mail servers and/or degrade network performance. Mass-mailing worms may impact individual system performance and compromise security settings allowing unauthorized remote access to the compromised host.
Trojans or backdoor listeners if not addressed through prudent remediation steps, can compromise network and host security. Additionally, trojans and backdoor listeners potentially allow theft of information, unauthorized remote access, and damage to critical files.
Remediation
| Matrix N7 | X |
| Matrix E7 | X |
| Matrix E6 | X |
| Matrix E5 | X |
| Matrix E1 | X |
| VH | X |
| C-Series | X |
Detection
Specific Dragon signatures that detect the W32.Reatle@mm and W32.Reatle.C@mm worms can be retrieved via Dragon Live Update and are located in the Master Library within the ENSRT category. The signatures with the prefix "ENSRT:W32-REATLE" can be copied into a custom library and deployed on a Dragon network sensor that is protecting the enterprise SMTP server to successfully detect end-user class machines which have become infected with the worm.
NOTE: Some signatures associated with Reatle worm detection may also trigger based on specific versions of the MyTob and MyDoom mass mailing worms
If utilizing Dynamic Intrusion Response (DIR), a Dragon Alarmtool policy that consists of an event group that contains all of the signatures within the "ENSRT:W32-REATLE" family should be used. A threshold parameter of at least three signature detections within a time span of 60 seconds should be used to mitigate the existence of false positives.
NOTE: All signatures in the ENSRT library are disabled by default. These signatures must be enabled after they are imported into a custom library if they are to be successfully deployed.
Prevention
Trusted End System solutions are capable of monitoring various end system activity. TES is able to take immediate action such as firewalling specific IPs, TCP/UDP ports, applications, or placing the user into a Quarantine policy or VLAN until end system threat is mitigated. Learn more at: http://www.enterasys.com/solutions/secure-networks/trusted_end_system/
Containment
The Enterasys Dynamic Intrusion Response (DIR) solution can be utilized to remove infected end-users from the enterprise network by detecting the infection with a Dragon NIDS signature (see "Detection" section of this report), locating the user's connection point using Automated Security Manager's location services module, and either placing the user in a quarantine VLAN or disabling the associated switch port for the user.
Using Enterasys Policy Manager, enforce a policy that allows SMTP traffic from end user PCs to authorized SMTP mail servers and blocks SMTP traffic to unauthorized end users or unknown Internet systems. If the SMTP protocol is not implemented for end users within the enterprise, consider implementing a policy blocking SMTP traffic from end user ports.
Internet or edge facing firewalls should be configured with a default 'Deny' policy and contain 'Permit' policies for only needed services and applications. Furthermore, careful inspection of firewall policies that allow TCP traffic streams to be initiated from the Internet into internal enterprise resources is required. These policies should only allow specific protocols to trusted servers thereby combating the increased use of random TCP ports by Internet Trojans and worms.
Repair
Monitor Dragon Realtime Console for alerts that end-user PCs have become infected with the virus. If utilizing the DIR solution, users can either be expunged from the network or placed in a quarantine VLAN. Once isolated, see your anti-virus vendor for Windows repair procedures for infected users.
Scan all clients and servers for newly opened TCP ports that did not appear in previous TCP scans. If viruses are detected apply appropriate removal tools on each client and server that have the open ports (See your anti-virus solution for removal instructions).
References
http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.reatle@mm.html
http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.reatle.c@mm.html
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms04-011.mspx
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A copy of the text of this section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. All information herein is Copyright ©Enterasys Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. All information above is subject to change without notice.
Revision History:
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Version: 1.0 |
Date: 07/21/2005 |
Author: ENSRT STAFF |
Change |